We present a public key encryption scheme for relational databases (PKDE) that allows the owner to control the execution of cross-relation joins on an outsourced server. The scheme allows anyone to deposit encrypted records in a database on the server. Thereafter, the database owner may authorize the server to join any two relations to identify matching records across them, while preventing self-joins that would reveal information on records that are unmatched in the join. The security of our construction is formally proved in the random oracle model based on the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Specifically, before a relation is joined, its encrypted records enjoy IND-CCA2 security; after a join, our scheme offers One-Way CCA2 security protection on the records. Our PKDE construction is shown to outperform the only existing work, both in security guarantee and in efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
Data outsourcing is gaining in adoption as it relieves users of the burden of storage and database management. The drawback is that users may lose control of their data, which gives rise to concerns whether confidentiality of the data will be safeguarded according to security provisions. To mitigate these concerns, one solution is to encrypt the data before releasing them to the outsourced server.
However, standard encryption schemes are not applicable in data outsourcing as queries cannot be executed directly on the ciphertexts. Pang and Ding [1] first studied ad hoc equijoins on encrypted relations in an outsourced database in a private key setting. Their scheme offers IND-CPA security on records that the database owner encrypts before sending them to the outsourced server. Subsequently, the owner may issue a query token for the server to join the encrypted records across two relations.
In this paper, we study the problem of supporting ad hoc equijoins on encrypted relations, in a public key setting. To exemplify the problem, consider the following application: Suppose that pharmacies are required to report the sale of certain controlled drugs to the health authority. The pharmacies encrypt each transaction with the public key of the health authority (the data owner), before submitting the encrypted records to a contractor (the server) that the owner outsources to. To pick up suspicious incidents where a patient repeatedly purchases a drug from different pharmacies, the owner issues a token for the server to perform equijoins, on the encrypted patient social security number and drug identifier, across the data collected from the pharmacies. The server should not be able to deduce the patient identities in the join results, nor the purchase patterns of the majority of patients who visit only their respective local pharmacies and hence are not in the join result. Technically, the latter implies that the server must not be allowed to perform self-joins, i.e., joining a pharmacy's data collection with itself on patients' social security number; in this sense, we say that the equijoins are controlled. Similar applications abound, including one where banks are required to report transfers of large cash amounts to the monetary authority or law enforcement.
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key and A is a confidential attribute. Relation S contains records {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n }, according to schema K S , B, · · · where K S is the primary key and B is a confidential attribute. In a PKDE scheme, with the public key of the database owner, anyone is able to encrypt records on attribute A (resp. B) before depositing them in relation R (resp. S). Moreover, the database owner may generate a join token T AB to enable the server to perform an equijoin only across attribute A of relation R and attribute B of relation S, denoted as R A=B S.
Logically, the encrypted records have different confidentiality assurances before and after an equijoin, which we termed initial confidentiality and post-join confidentiality respectively. In initial confidentiality, we require that any encrypted data should achieve indistinguishability under adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). The equijoin groups the matched records in relations R and S into equivalence classes on join attributes A and B, meaning that the records become comparable and are no longer indistinguishable. Instead, in post-join confidentiality, we require the encrypted data to possess one-way property under chosen ciphertext attacks (OW-CCA2).
Indeed, the equivalence classes produced in an equijoin may leak some statistical information on the matched records in the join result. Referring to the motivating example earlier, it implies that patients who are not reported by different pharmacies would have their privacy safeguarded, as their records would not be in the result of any equijoin authorized by the owner. Notwithstanding that, there is a need to protect the privacy of records that are unmatched in the join, just like in private set intersection protocols. In this regard, we require that the equijoin must be controlled ; technically, a join token T AB for R A=B S must not be abused to carry out other join operations, including self-joins R A=A R and S B=B S which would reveal the equivalence classes on the unmatched records that are not in the join result.
We present a probabilistic PKDE construction on bilinear groups. The construction is formally proved to be secure with respect to initial confidentiality as well as post-join confidentiality, in the random oracle model based on the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption. The construction is non-interactive in that, given a join token, the server can carry out the equijoin on the operand relations without any help from the database owner. An efficiency analysis shows that our scheme saves roughly 25% in storage cost compared to Pang and Ding's scheme [1] , while strengthening the initial confidentiality from IND-CPA to IND-CCA2.
Related Work
Carbunar and Sion [2] first studied private join on outsourced database in a private key setting. Although their scheme supports general binary join predicates including range, equality, Hamming distance, and semantics, there is no provision to deter self-joins. Furukawa and Isshiki [3] provided a scheme where the server requires an authorization from the owner to carry out an equijoin. However, that authorization can also be used beyond the equijoin, to perform self-joins on the operand relations. Controlled equijoin for relational databases was initially investigated by Pang and Ding [1] in a private key setting. Their solution encrypts each value to 8 elements in a bilinear group, compared to 6 elements in our construction.
Yang et al. [4] introduced the notion of public key encryption with equality test (PKEET). Given two ciphertexts (that may have been produced with different public keys), anyone is able to compare and detect whether they have the same underlying message. When applied to our outsourced database problem, their scheme provides no initial confidentiality for the encrypted data. Moreover, the server could freely perform equijoin on any pair of relations, which does not suit our requirements. Lu, Zhang and Lin [5] showed how to achieve a stronger security model in PKEET when the message space is large and has high mininum entropy (which is not true in databases in general, and for non-unique attributes with skewed distribution in particular).
Several follow-on studies, including [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] , have extended PKEET with delegable/authorized equality test such that only a suitably enabled server can perform equality test on the ciphertexts. All these studies do not provide a formal security model and strict proof on the initial confidentiality of data. Moreover, the schemes do not offer controlled equality test, meaning that they cannot prevent self-joins. In [6] , even without any authorization, anyone is able to compare two ciphertexts generated under the same public key. The PKEET schemes proposed in [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] allow two users to authorize a tester to compare their ciphertexts. With that authorization, however, the tester is also able to compare among the ciphertexts generated by the same user. Table 1 summarizes the differentiation between the existing work and our scheme.
Private set intersection (PSI) allows two parties to compute the intersection between their respective data sets, at the same time leaking no information on the remaining data [12, 13] . Outsourced PSI [14, 15] in particular addresses how two parties may delegate set intersection operations to a server. Each input data set to a PSI protocol must contain only distinct elements; otherwise, the same element will be encoded to the same string. This implies that PSI may leak statistical information on the data when applied to databases in which different records may share the same attribute value. Furthermore, PSI does not need to provide decryption functionality for the outsourced data, unlike our PKDE scheme. [4] Public key × × Tang [6] Public key × × Tang [7] Public key × Ma et al. [8] Public key × Huang et al. [9] Public key × Ma et al. [10] Public key × Lin, Qu and Zhang [11] Public key × Carbunar and Sion [2] Private key × × Furukawa and Isshiki [3] Private key × Pang and Ding [1] Private key This paper
Public key "Aut" denotes the authorization that issued to the server for enabling equijoin on R and S.
Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the framework and security model for PKDE scheme, and covers some background on our work. Section 3 presents a construction of PKDE. We prove the security of the PKDE construction and analyze its efficiency in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
Our system model consists of a database owner, many users and a curious server. The database includes two relations R and S with respective confidential attributes A and B. Suppose relation R contains records {r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r m } and relation S contains records {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n }. We assume that A, B are integers in M ⊂ [0, p) for some large prime number p; support for bool, float, double and string attributes can be built on top of integer operations as explained in [1] .
The owner engages the server to host database. The users send encrypted records to the server, and the owner is able to request the server to execute queries on the data. The equijoin query, also known as inner join, of R and S is:
The outer join of R and S is:
The difference between RS OJ and RS IJ gives the set of R and S records that found no matches (NM) in the other operand relation:
Framework
In a public key encryption scheme for relational database with controlled equijoin (PKDE), equality test can only be carried out on cross-relation ciphertexts after the server gets a join token from the owner and, particularly, equality test cannot be performed on unmatched ciphertexts within either relation. A PKDE scheme consists of the following procedures.
• KeyGen(1 ) → (P K, SK): Given security parameter , the database owner executes the key generation procedure to produce a pair of public and secret keys (P K, SK).
On input a pair of public and private keys (P K, SK) and a description D of some relation, such as R or S with confidential attributes A and B, the database owner executes the set-up procedure to produce a pair of public and private tokens (PT , ST ) for the corresponding relation.
: With public key P K and public token PT A , any user can run the data encryption procedure on the confidential attribute A in some record r i to produce ciphertext
The data decryption procedure, which is run by the database owner, takes as input secret key SK, private token ST A , and ciphertexts {A i } m i=1 for R.A. For each record r i ∈ R, the procedure outputs plaintext r i .A if A i has not been tampered with, or ⊥ otherwise.
• QueryGen(ST A , ST B ) → T AB : With private tokens ST A and ST B for relations R and S, respectively, the query generation procedure, which is carried out by the owner of the relations, outputs query token T AB for R A=B S.
The join procedure, which is carried out by the server, takes as input public key P K, query token T AB , ciphertexts
for confidential attribute A in relation R, and ciphertexts {B j } n j=1
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for confidential attribute B in relation S. The procedure outputs RS IJ = R A=B S, and RS N M which contains the unmatched R and S records.
A PKDE scheme must be able to correctly decrypt the ciphertext that it produces, as well as perform crossrelation equality test on the ciphertexts. Definition 2.1 (Correctness). A PKDE scheme is correct if, for any security parameter ∈ N, any pair of public key and secret key (P K, SK) ← KeyGen(1 ), any relation R with r i .A ∈ M for all r i ∈ R that is encrypted by the scheme can be decrypted, i.e., DecData(SK,
Definition 2.2 (Cross-relation equality test).
A PKDE scheme possesses the cross-relation equality test property if, for any security parameter ∈ N, the following conditions hold:
• Completeness: This property means that every pair of matched records r i , s j will be matched by the equijoin. Specifically, for every m ∈ M and for every r i ∈ R, s j ∈ S such that m = r i .A and m = s j .B,
• Soundness: This property means that every pair of records (r i , s j ) with distinct encrypted values will not be matched by the equijoin. Specifically, for every polynomial time algorithm P,
• Controlled equijoin 1 : This property means that the server cannot perform self join on R N M or S N M after executing equijoin on (R, S) with T AB .
Specifically, for any ∈ N, any pair of public and secret keys (P K, SK) ← KeyGen(1 ), any relations R and S, after running
Initial Confidentiality Requirement
Any encrypted relation that has not been involved in a join operation must satisfy indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. The protection is captured formally by the following security game Game ind−cca2 E,PKDEinit which is jointly carried out by a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary E and a challenger C. Setup: With security parameter , challenger C runs algorithm KeyGen(1 ) to generate a pair of publicsecret keys (P K, SK). It also runs Setup(P K, SK, D R ) to generate a pair of public and private tokens (PT A , ST A ) for relation R with confidential attribute A. Then, C gives P K and PT A to adversary E. Stage 1: Adversary E adaptively issues queries on records of relation R, in which A is a confidential attribute.
• Decryption query: E submits a ciphertext A i to C.
The challenger invokes DecData(·) with SK and ST A , and sends the result r i .A to E if it can be decrypted successfully; otherwise C sends back ⊥. 
Post-Join Confidentiality Requirement
After an equijoin, the encrypted records of PKDE scheme would not enjoy indistinguishability protection. Suppose that before the join, R and S are orthogonal relations that separately enjoy IND-CCA2 protection for their confidential attributes A and B. After the join, R and S are no longer orthogonal. Instead, logically we have joined relations RS IJ and RS N M . Essentially, the equijoin effectively groups the matched records in R and S into equivalence classes, each containing all the matched records with the same R.A or S.B value. An adversary may be able to deduce the cleartext value corresponding to some of the classes, through frequency analysis on the class cardinalities. This is especially so with a small attribute domain M, such as char, byte and short integer types. On the other hand, if domain M is large and frequency analysis is infeasible, the encrypted records enjoy one-way privacy, which is similar to that defined by Yang et al. [4] for PKEET scheme. Formally, post-join confidentiality for the encrypted records in R (the same for S) is captured by the following security game Game ow−cca2 E,PKDEpost which is jointly carried out by a PPT adversary E and a challenger C.
Setup: With security parameter , challenger C runs algorithm KeyGen(1 ) to generate a pair of public-secret keys (P K, SK).
It also runs Setup(P K, SK) to generate two pairs of public and private tokens (PT A , ST A ), (PT B , ST B ) for relations R and S respectively, and query token T AB ← QueryGen(ST A , ST B ). Then, C gives P K, PT A , PT B and T AB to adversary E. This way, E sees relations RS IJ and RS N M which may be empty initially. Stage 1: Adversary E adaptively poses the following queries on records of R and S. The challenger maintains all the intermediate information.
2
• R-decryption query. E asks for the decryption of ciphertext A i in record r i ∈ R. The challenger invokes DecData(·) with SK and ST A , and sends the result r i .A to E if A i can be decrypted successfully, or ⊥ otherwise.
• S-decryption query. E asks for the decryption of ciphertext B j in record s j ∈ S. The challenger invokes DecData(·) with SK and ST B , and sends the result s j .B to E if B j can be decrypted successfully, or ⊥ otherwise.
Challenge: The challenger randomly chooses a message m $ ← M for relation R such that m has not been involved in any of the aforementioned queries. The challenger encrypts m as Y by invoking EncData(·) with P K and PT A , and sends the challenge ciphertext Y to adversary E.
Stage 2: Adversary E poses queries in the same way as in stage 1, with the restriction that Y cannot be submitted in any decryption query.
Output
Mathematical Assumptions
Our PKDE scheme is built on bilinear groups. Let G = g and G T be cyclic groups of prime order p. G is a bilinear group if there exists a bilinear map e : G × G → G T with the following properties:
ab .
• Non-degeneracy:ê(g, g) = 1.
• Computability: All group operations in G, G T and bilinear mappingê(·, ·) can be computed efficiently.
Our PKDE scheme will rely on the following complexity assumptions.
Discrete logarithm assumption (DL): Let G = g be a cyclic group of prime order p. Given a random element h ∈ R G, any PPT algorithm E would have negligible probability in computing x ∈ Z * p such that h = g x . Computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (BDH) [16] . Let G = g be a cyclic group with bilinear mappingê : G × G → G T , where G and G T have prime order p. Given a tuple (g, g a , g b , g c ) for some random values a, b, c ∈ R Z * p , any PPT algorithm E would have negligible probability in computingê(g, g) abc ∈ G T .
A CONCRETE PKDE CONSTRUCTION
The construction of our PKDE scheme is given below. For ease of presenting the security results, we state the Setup and EncData procedures for R and S separately.
• KeyGen(1 ) → (P K, SK): Given security parameter , construct a cyclic group G = g with bilinear mappingê : G × G → G T where G and = (σ, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) . The parameters P K = (G, G T ,ê, p, g, S, h 1 , h 2 , H 1 , H 2 ) are published publicly.
•
. The public and private tokens for relation R are PT A = (Γ A , Υ A ) and ST A = (τ A , κ A ), respectively.
• Setup(P K, SK, D S ) → (PT B , ST B ): Similar to the set-up procedure for relation R.
log p where:
Here, if |r i .A| < log p, then the binary representation of r i .A will be padded with leading "0"s. To explain the importance of the condition −σ 3 /σ 1 mod p ∈ M in the Setup procedure, suppose on the contrary that there are two records r 1 , r 2 ∈ R with r 1 .A = r 2 .A = −σ 3 /σ 1 mod p. The encryption of r 1 .A and r 2 .A will include
A , respectively. This allows an adversary to deduce thatê(A 1,2 , A 2,4 ) =ê(A 1,4 , A 2,2 ) implies r 1 .A = r 2 .A, without any query token.
• EncData(P K, PT B , S.B) → {B j } n j=1 : Using P K and PT B , anyone may encrypt the confidential attribute B in a record for S before depositing it with the server. For each record s j ∈ S, let λ j , µ j , y j $ ← Z * p and represent s j .B by encrypted tuple B j = B j,1 , B j,2 , B j,3 , B j,4 , B j,5 , B j,6 ∈ G 5 × {0, 1} log p where:
• DecData(SK,
For all r i ∈ R, the owner computes
then verifies that r i .A ∈ M and
If either of the checks fails, the user sets r i .A =⊥ to signify that A i is corrupted.
• DecData(SK, ST B , {B j } n j=1 ) → S.B: Similar to the decryption procedure for relation R.
• QueryGen(ST A , ST B ) → T AB : For equijoin query R A=B S, the owner generates a token T AB = κ B /τ A , κ A /τ B and sends it to the server.
If any pair of records r i ∈ R with cipher- 6 , and s j ∈ S with ciphertext B j = B j,1 , B j,2 , B j,3 , B j,4 , B j,5 , B j,6 , satisfy the following condition,
then the server determines that r i .A = s j .B and inserts r i , s j into RS IJ . R and S records that have no matching counterpart in S and R, respectively, are inserted into RS N M .
Theorem 3.1. The PKDE scheme proposed above is correct.
Proof. Elaborating on Formula (2), due to the properties of the bilinear group,
Similarly,
If r i .A = s j .B, the right-hand-side of Equations (3) and (4) are the same, so the left-hand-side of the equations must match. Consequently, the condition in Formula (2) must hold.
λi Therefore, equality (1) holds and r i .A is decrypted correctly.
ANALYSIS

Security Results
Theorem 4.1. The proposed PKDE scheme in Section 3 is complete, sound and controlled for crossrelation equijoin.
Proof. We first show the completeness property. For any key pair (P K, SK) ← KeyGen(1 ), relation tokens (PT A , ST A ) ← Setup(P K, SK, D R ) and
, for every m ∈ M and every r i ∈ R, s j ∈ S such that m = r i .A and m = s j .B, let A i = A i,1 , · · · , A i,6 be the ciphertext of r i .A and B j = B j,1 , · · · , B j,6 the ciphertext of s j .B. Equality (2) holds because r i .A = s j .B, so r i , s j ∈ RS IJ .
Next, consider the soundness property. Given
for R.A and {B j } n j=1 for S.B, along with query token T AB = (κ B /τ A , κ A /τ B ). Equality (2) cannot hold for any r i ∈ R, s j ∈ S if r i .A = s j .B. This is because
.B+σ3 . We continue to consider the property of controlled equijoin. Without loss of generality, consider two distinct ciphertexts
To perform equality test on them, Formula (2) can only hold in the following way:
which requires the server knowing κ A /τ A . However, it is impossible for the server to deduce κ A /τ A from the query token T AB .
Theorem 4.2. Prior to an equijoin, the proposed PKDE scheme in Section 3 is IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model assuming that the computational BDH assumption holds.
The following proof follows the standard framework established in [16, 17] .
Proof. Let E = (E 1 , E 2 ) be a PPT adversary that has advantage in attacking the IND-CCA2 security of the PKDE scheme in the initial phase. Suppose E issues at most q D decryption queries, at most q H1 hash queries of H 1 , and at most q H2 hash queries of H 2 (here, q D , q H1 and q H2 are positive). Using E, we construct an algorithm I to solve the computational BDH problem with non-negligible probability.
At first, algorithm I is given BDH parameters (G, G T , p,ê) and a BDH instance (g, g a , g b , g c ). The goal of I is to compute Λ =ê(g, g)
abc . Algorithm I simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary E as follows:
Setup. Algorithm I randomly picks
a , and computes the elements in P K and PT A according to the proposed scheme.
Adversary E is able to issue hash queries to H 1 and H 2 at any time as follows. O H1 and O H2 are random oracles controlled by I. To respond to these two types of hash queries, I maintains two lists L 1 and L 2 of tuples. These lists are initially empty.
log p , and append the tuple
, algorithm I responds as follows:
If there is a tuple (T
If not, randomly pick a coin cn i ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[cn i = 0] = ρ (ρ will be determined later). Randomly pick a value ω i
Return Ω i , and append (
Decryption queries. For input ciphertext
be the corresponding tuple on the query list L 2 .
• If cn i = 0, then algorithm I reports failure and terminates.
• Otherwise, we know cn i = 1 and Ω i = g 
log p , and computes
Next, I runs O H2 with (A d,2 , A d,3 , A d,4 ) . If cn d = 1, then algorithm I reports failure and terminates. If not, I sets the other two components in the challenge ciphertext as follows:
Thus, Y is a valid ciphertext for message m d . More decryption queries. Adversary E can issue more decryption queries for ciphertexts A i,1 , · · · , A i, 6 , with the restriction that Y cannot be submitted in decryption queries.
Guess. Eventually, E outputs a guess d ∈ {0, 1} to indicate whether Y is an encryption of m 0 or m 1 . Algorithm I randomly picks a tuple (
abc to the given BDH instance, where ω d is generated in the challenge phase. Note that the responses to H 1 and H 2 queries are uniformly and independently distributed in Z * p and G * , respectively, which means they perfectly simulate a real attack. Thus, if algorithm I does not abort in the simulation, then adversary E's view is identical to that in the real attack. That means if I does not abort, then
We continue to show the probability that algorithm I aborts during the simulation. Suppose adversary E issues q D decryption queries in total. Thus, the probability that algorithm I does not abort in the decryption queries in the two phases is:
Also, the probability that I does not abort in the challenge phase is:
Therefore, the probability that algorithm I does not abort in the simulation is:
. Accordingly, the probability that I does not abort in the simulation is at least 1 e(q D +1) , which implies that algorithm I's advantage is at least e(q D +1) . Here, e is the base of the natural logarithm.
We then show that algorithm I outputs a correct answer Λ =ê(g, g)
abc with probability at least
) has been submitted to O H1 at some point. We prove the following lemma, in an identical way as [16, Claims 1 and 2].
Due to the perfectness of the simulation, Pr[E i |¬E i−1 ] in the simulation is equal to that in the real attack, which in turn means that Pr[E] in the two cases are identical.
In the real attack, if event E does not happen, then the decryption of the challenge ciphertext Y is independent of adversary E's view, which means Pr[d = d|¬E] = 1/2. Hence, the following facts hold.
Together, they imply that
On the other hand,
Combine with Equality (5), we get the relationship
e(q D +1) holds in the real attack as well as in the simulation.
Thus, the success probability of algorithm I picking a correct answer is at least
If is not negligible, neither is Adv After an equijoin, the proposed PKDE scheme in Section 3 is OW-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model assuming that the computational BDH assumption holds.
The following proof follows the standard framework established in [4] .
Proof. Let E be a PPT adversary attacking the OW-CCA2 security of the PKDE scheme after an equijoin. Suppose E issues at most q D decryption queries (including both R-and S-decryption queries), at most q H1 hash queries of H 1 , and at most q H2 hash queries of H 2 (here, q D , q H1 and q H2 are positive). Let Adv ow−cca2 E,PKDEpost ( ) denote the advantage of E's attacks in the security game. Using E, we then construct an algorithm I to solve the computational BDH problem with non-negligible probability. Algorithm I simulates the challenger and answers the queries of adversary E.
More specifically, we prove the theorem using hybrid games Game post G i . The first one Game post G 0 models the original OW-CCA2 security game, the second shows that the two-phase OW-CCA2 security game Game post G 0 can be simplified with a negligible security sacrifice, and the following games are perfectly simulated in the random oracle model. Let Ψ i denote the event that m = m in Game post G i . Accordingly, E's success probability in Game post G i is Pr[Ψ i ]. We first consider the original security game.
, and
PT B , T AB , * ) with the following oracles.
• O H1 : For an input element T , O H1 responds with a random value in a consistent way, meaning that the same value will be returned for the same input. When composing a ciphertext, the adversary should invoke this oracle; similarly, this oracle is invoked in answering decryption queries.
• O H2 : Similar to O H1 , for an input tuple (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ), O H2 responds with a random value in a consistent way. When composing a ciphertext, the adversary should invoke this oracle; similarly, this oracle is invoked in answering decryption queries.
, O D1 runs the decryption procedure of the PKDE scheme using private parameters σ, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , κ A , τ A .
• O D2 : For a decryption query on B j = B j,1 , · · · , B j, 6 , O D2 runs the decryption procedure of the PKDE scheme using private parameters σ, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , κ B , τ B .
, where the oracles work in the same way as in step 2 except that decryption queries on Y are not allowed.
5 If m = m, E wins the game.
Next, we define a simplified security game and show its relationship with Game post G 0 .
T AB , Y, * ) with the following oracles.
• O H1 : The same as in Game post G 0 .
• O H2 : The same as in Game post G 0 .
• O D1 : The same as in Game post G 0 .
• O D2 : The same as in Game post G 0 .
4 If m = m, E wins the game. Proof. For ease of presentation, let E = (E 1 , E 2 ) and F denote the adversaries in Game post G 0 and Game post G 1 , respectively. Adversary F initiates Game post G 1 and receives challenge ciphertext Y from the security game, before running E. For E 1 's hash queries to O H1 and O H2 , F responds using its corresponding oracles. For decryption queries, F uses its own O D1 and O D2 ; the exception is that F aborts the security game if some Y such that DecData(SK, * , Y ) = m is submitted, which happens with probability at most 1 |M| . Eventually, E 1 terminates and outputs a state state. Next, F runs E 2 with (state, Y ), and uses its corresponding oracles to answer E 2 's queries. Eventually, E 2 terminates and F outputs whatever m that E 2 outputs.
• O D1 : On input a ciphertext A i,1 , · · · , A i, 6 , if A i,j = A j holds for 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 yet A i,6 = A 6 , I returns ⊥. Otherwise, algorithm I performs the following steps:
is returned only when Equality (1) is satisfied, otherwise return ⊥.
• O D2 : The same as in Game post G 3 .
Let E 2 denote the event that E queries O H1 witĥ e(g, g)
abc .
If event E 2 does not happen by the end of the simulation, then I aborts with failure. To show that the decryption queries to O D1 are simulated indistinguishably from Game post G 3 , we analyze the decryption queries as follows:
a ) has been queried to O H1 before a decryption query for
) is issued. In this case, A i,6 is uniquely determined. Thus, the decryption oracle O D1 is perfectly simulated.
a ) has not been queried to O H1 before a decryption query for
) is issued. In this case, O D1 will output ⊥. Thus, the simulations would fail if A i is a valid ciphertext. Due to the idealness of O H1 , this happens with probability 1/p. Letting E 3 denote the event that a valid ciphertext is rejected in the simulation, we have
Thus, if event E 3 does not happen, the simulations are identical to Game post G 3 , which implies Pr[
Thus, we have
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.4.
We continue to show that event Ψ 3 can only happen with negligible probability if the discrete logarithm problem is hard.
Proof. Suppose that event Ψ 3 happens with nonnegligible probability, we can construct a PPT algorithm I that breaks the DL assumption. At first, I is given a DL instance (g, g a ) ∈ G 2 , with the goal of computing a ∈ Z * p . Algorithm I randomly picks σ,
log p , and generates the challenge ciphertext Y = A 1 , · · · , A 6 as follows:
Algorithm I also randomly picks ω 
Efficiency Analysis
We continue to analyze the computational complexity of the procedures in the proposed PKDE scheme. The analysis focuses on the most time-consuming operations, that is, exponentiations in cyclic groups G and G T , and bilinear pairingê. Their evaluation times are denoted by χ G , χ G T , χê, respectively. Table  2 summarizes the computation costs of each procedure and makes a comparison with the most relevant existing work in [1] . In the table, the computation costs are analyzed for one evaluation, that is, one encryption, one decryption, and one join. In an encryption, both schemes require roughly the same computations -8 exponentiations and 1 bilinear mapping. More specifically, in our PKDE scheme, the exponentiation for the last element (e.g., A i, 6 or B j,6 ) of a ciphertext is taken on G. In fact, this exponentiation can also be moved to be performed on G T . In this way, both schemes enjoy the same encryption efficiency. For decryption, our construction requires 3 exponentiations and 4 bilinear mapping operations, whereas there is no efficient decryption procedure in [1] . Also, our scheme has a more efficient join mechanism that incurs one less bilinear mapping than that in [1] . Moreover, query token generation in both our PKDE scheme and [1] take only two multiplications, involving no time-consuming computation. As for storage cost, our PKDE scheme also outperforms [1] in that the latter one has larger ciphertext size as shown in Table 3 , where ξ G and ξ Z denote the element size of G and Z p , respectively.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the problem of privacypreserving and controlled equijoin on databases that are hosted by an untrusted server. With the database owner's authorization, the server is able to perform an equijoin of two operand relations without decrypting their data or interacting with the owner. Moreover, the authorization cannot be abused to carry out any other join, including self-joins on the operand relations that would disclose statistical information even on records that are not in the equijoin result; in this sense, the equjoin is controlled. We introduce the notion of public key encryption for relational database with controlled equijoin (PKDE), and formalize its security model to capture two phases of data confidentiality. In the initial phase before any equijoin is performed, encrypted data should enjoy IND-CCA2 security. After an equijoin, the data would satisfy OW-CCA2 security. We propose a construction for our PKDE scheme and formally prove its security in our security model under the computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. An efficiency analysis shows that our construction outperforms the only existing scheme (that however is formulated for a private key setting).
